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The Sources and Processes of 
Tax and Subsidy Competition
Kenneth P. Thomas
University of Missouri–St. Louis
Tax and subsidy competition has two structural sources: the need 
of governments for investment, what Winters (1996) calls the “invest-
ment imperative” in his updating of Lindblom (1977); and the mobility 
of capital. Together, they create a dynamic in which governments must 
compete for investment in what, since World War II, has been an ever-
widening market. Today, as virtually all governments engage in this be-
havior, the “market for investment” is one where the “sellers” (potential 
investors) have certain advantages over the “buyers” (governments).1 
First, capital mobility is increasing, making more locations feasible 
sites for any particular investment, thereby intensifying competition. 
Examples range from national and regional governments bidding on 
auto assembly plants, to suburbs fi ghting to land the sales tax revenue 
that comes from a retail development. Second, while uncoordinated 
sanctioning of adverse government policies occurs, there also exists 
coordination among direct investors through the operations of site loca-
tion consultants. These consulting fi rms work to extract greater conces-
sions in negotiations over individual projects, and in doing so create an 
atmosphere where governments believe it is necessary to offer incen-
tives to be considered for an investment project at all. Finally, informa-
tion asymmetries favor fi rms over governments. The latter have little 
idea of what is truly necessary to offer to land a particular investment, 
nor do they know when the next desirable investment opportunity will 
come along (particularly at the level of truly large projects, of which 
there are only about 200–300 annually in the United States). Coordina-
tion of government policies is the logical way to blunt the dynamic of 
competition for investment. Only the European Union, however, has 
proved successful at this; favorable basic laws (the Treaty of Rome) 
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and a centralized monitoring and enforcement capacity have enabled 
the EU to exert some control over the investment-attraction activities 
of Member State, regional, and local governments within its territory 
(Thomas 2000).
This chapter begins with a discussion of why a market for invest-
ment arises in a capitalist system with multiple polities. It highlights the 
investment imperative and documents the growing mobility of capital. 
It argues that the two-sided prisoner’s dilemma that comprises a mar-
ket has been reduced to a single prisoner’s dilemma among the buyers 
of investment due to inherent advantages investors possess. This result 
emphasizes the need for comprehensive, cooperative solutions among 
governments, at the state level to regulate cities’ behavior, and at the 
federal level to regulate states.
The bulk of this chapter analyzes the use and abuse of location in-
centives—those subsidies, of whatever form, that are used to attract 
investment to a particular jurisdiction. It briefl y reviews the potential 
effi ciency, equity, and environmental drawbacks to these subsidies, and 
then focuses on several case studies that illustrate the main policy di-
lemmas that arise with the use of location incentives. Several impor-
tant themes stand out: backroom deals, lack of transparency and ef-
fective citizen participation, the pernicious infl uence of site location 
consultants, and the comingling of eminent domain abuse with subsidy 
abuse.
The cases considered all come from the St. Louis metropolitan re-
gion. Missouri has been prominently noted as one of the country’s worst 
abusers of tax increment fi nancing (LeRoy 2005, p. 146), and as one of 
the worst abusers of eminent domain (Berliner 2003, p. 117). The St. 
Louis region is notably more abusive than the Kansas City region, as 
documented by the Brookings Institution (Luce 2003, p. 16; see also 
LeRoy 2005, p. 146).
The chapter concludes with a number of policy recommendations. 
To preview them briefl y, they are the introduction of transparency and 
accountability legislation, as pioneered in Minnesota, guarantees of ef-
fective citizen participation in the economic development process, a na-
tional ban on relocation subsidies, and eventual establishment of rules 
about what is and is not an allowable subsidy, along with the means to 
monitor and enforce these rules.
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THE MARKET FOR INVESTMENT
The market for investment consists of governments competing for 
investment and fi rms competing for investment sites. It arises as a re-
sult of two structural features of the world’s political-economic system. 
First, as it has been for over 500 years, the global economic system is 
capitalist in nature. Since most economic activity is private under capi-
talism, the ability of government to produce the investment it needs is 
limited. Second, the world is a political system with multiple polities. 
This is the ultimate structural basis for the mobility of capital, as Chase-
Dunn (1981, p. 31) argues. Thus, in a capitalist system with multiple 
polities, governments must compete with each other for investment, 
whether the competition takes place between nations or in subnational 
units such as U.S. states, Canadian provinces, and cities. 
Governments depend on private investors for investment because 
without it there is neither economic activity to tax (and hence no way to 
attain their goals, whatever they might be) nor economic outcomes con-
ducive to reelection. This classic formulation of Lindblom (1977) (the 
“privileged position” of business) has been updated by Winters (1996, 
p. 1–41), who extends it to nondemocratic states, and grounds it in more 
general theories of resource dependence. Because securing investment 
is a prerequisite to any goal government might have, Winters calls this 
the “investment imperative.” However, if capital were not mobile, 
governments and fi rms would simply negotiate over the conditions of 
investment (perhaps only implicitly). The addition of capital mobility 
intensifi es this dynamic by forcing governments to compete for invest-
ment with other governments in the same structural situation.
In general, capital mobility refers to the ability of owners of capital 
to place it in a variety of locations (this must be distinguished from 
actual capital movements). For nonfi nancial capital (the focus of this 
chapter), we can think of it also as the ability to coordinate production 
over an extended geographical scale. For both fi nancial and nonfi nan-
cial capital, these are importantly determined by the costs of transporta-
tion and communications. These costs have been falling dramatically, 
especially since the end of World War II. For example, the cost of in-
ternational phone calls fell in real terms approximately 95 percent be-
tween 1945 and 1990, and international passenger transport costs fell 
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by about 80 percent in the same period. We have, of course, witnessed 
further innovations in both of these areas, and rapidly declining costs to 
use them (Thomas 1997, p. 64–66). 
As mentioned above, the concept of a “market for investment” 
suggests that there is competition among sellers (investors) as well as 
among buyers. In practice, there is a lot more competition for invest-
ment than competition for investment sites. First, capital mobility is 
increasing. This means there is an increasing number of economically 
feasible sites for any given investment, leading to an intensifi cation of 
the bidding wars over each investment, as fi rms have more options open 
to them and the collective action problem faced by governments be-
comes less tractable (Thomas 2000, p. 27–29).
Second, governments suffer from substantial information asym-
metries in their courting of investment. While a company interested in 
investing in a particular jurisdiction will have gathered a tremendous 
amount of information on that location, its political leaders, etc., the 
government may not even know the identity of the fi rm they are deal-
ing with; they may only talk to a site location consultant shopping for 
incentives (at least at the early stages). Government offi cials will not 
know the fi rm’s true decision criteria, and may not even know whether 
there are sites with which they are competing (Thomas 2000, p. 32). 
Finally, they do not know when the next desirable project will come 
along. Loveridge (1996, p. 152) estimated that there were only 200–300 
large-scale projects annually in the United States, with 15,000 invest-
ment attraction agencies pursuing them.
The third advantage favoring fi rms over states is that while states 
must organize to achieve cooperative results, uncoordinated action by 
fi rms may lead to their taking the same action. For example, if a given 
state inaugurates stricter antipollution laws, the likelihood is that any 
fi rm affected by this will mark that state off its list for future investment. 
This need not require any cooperation or even communication by the 
fi rms involved; it simply is a logical reaction to the new incentives each 
faces, as Lindblom (1977) has emphasized. In addition to this uncoor-
dinated sanctioning of adverse government policies, the widespread use 
of site location consultants has introduced an element of coordination 
into the behavior of direct investors that bond rating agencies provide 
for bond and stock investors. Sinclair (1994, pp. 144–145) has shown 
that bond ratings are affected by the rating agencies’ preferences for 
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government policies that have no necessary impact on their ability to 
service a loan. Similarly, site location consultants, in addition to trying 
to drive the very best bargain for their clients on each individual invest-
ment, also strive consciously to create a climate in which governments 
believe it is necessary to offer incentives in order to be considered for 
any investment. They do this both in private, preliminary discussions 
about individual projects, and through public comments in the press. In 
this way, location consulting fi rms help to coordinate the behavior of 
companies seeking investment sites. Moreover, they exacerbate the in-
formation asymmetry discussed earlier, and often receive a percentage 
of the incentive they obtain for their clients, giving them further incen-
tive to drive up incentive packages (Buchholz 1998, Chapter 5).
Taken together, these three factors explain why the market for in-
vestment, a two-sided prisoner’s dilemma in theory like any other mar-
ket, in fact reduces to a single prisoner’s dilemma among the buyers of 
investment. The usefulness of this model is demonstrated in both the 
United States and Canada, where voluntary “no-raiding” agreements 
among states or provinces have been universally unsuccessful (Thomas 
2000, pp. 167–168; 177). The ultimate solution to these bidding wars 
lies in what game theory would call third-party enforcement, which 
means that states must regulate the investment attraction activities of 
their local governments, and the federal government must curb the bid-
ding war among the states. We are, however, a long way from such a 
solution being politically viable, so the next section will consider the 
processes of competition for investment with a view toward illuminat-
ing the near-term reforms that may be achievable.
LOCATION INCENTIVES
Location incentives are those subsidies used to attract investment 
to a particular jurisdiction. They can take many forms: direct grant, tax 
break, free land, subsidized loan, etc. Some subsidies that started out 
as incentives to attract investors to a particular state have become so 
widely copied that it is now more reasonable to consider them what 
the EU calls “operating aids,” that is, subsidies for ongoing production. 
The classic example is the sales tax exemption for new equipment. The 
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Council of State Governments (Chi and Leatherby 1997, p. 2) classi-
fi es these tax breaks as “incentives,” but their incentive function has 
been completely blunted by the almost total spread of these programs 
throughout the country. A related form of subsidy with locational goals 
is the “retention incentive,” a subsidy given to prevent a fi rm from leav-
ing its present jurisdiction. New York City, whose companies are fre-
quently targeted by other jurisdictions, awarded over $2 billion in reten-
tion subsidies between 1987 and 2000 (Good Jobs New York 2003). 
Location subsidies are not always a bad policy. However, like all 
subsidies, they can have important potential drawbacks in the areas of 
effi ciency, equity, and the environment. In terms of effi ciency, subsidies 
can induce fi rms to locate to ineffi cient locations, to continue ineffi -
cient production, and can harm effi cient unsubsidized competitors. The 
major equity concern is that subsidies go to the owners of capital, who 
receive funds from the average taxpayer. This makes the after-tax, after-
subsidy distribution of income more uneven than it would have been 
in the absence of subsidies. Finally, for an important subset of subsi-
dies, the aided activity has harmful environmental consequences, such 
as building in a fl oodplain. These factors should give us pause when 
we consider whether a subsidy is an appropriate policy in a specifi c 
situation (Thomas 2000, pp. 4–5, 169–170). This section now turns to 
several case studies that illustrate the main policy dilemmas that arise 
with the use of location incentives. Rather than discussing high-profi le 
national searches, such as those recently conducted by Boeing, I will 
analyze several of the far more common smaller deals funded by mu-
nicipal and/or state governments.
Cases
In 1997, Mastercard International announced its intention to con-
solidate several St. Louis area facilities to a single location, not neces-
sarily in Missouri. A consolidation can lead to an intense bidding war 
because it means that the fi rm involved is threatening to disinvest from 
one or more locations. As psychologists and game theorists have noted, 
people tend to fear the loss of an existing benefi t more than they fear not 
receiving a new benefi t of the same size (“hysteresis”) (Hardin 1982, 
pp. 82–83). The auto industry, which has suffered from overcapacity in 
North America for decades, has seen several major cases of head-to-head 
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consolidation, such as GM’s pitting of Arlington, Texas, and Ypsilanti, 
Michigan, against each other (Thomas 1997, p. 127). In the Mastercard 
case, the company was reported to have considered 15 cities altogether, 
with the fi nal decision coming down to a faceoff between Dallas and 
the outer-ring St. Louis suburb of O’Fallon (Saint Louis Post-Dispatch, 
various issues). For Mastercard’s anticipated investment of just over 
$90 million, the state of Missouri put together an incentive package 
worth $42 million, plus several million more in tax abatements from 
O’Fallon and the local Francis Howell School District.2 This example 
highlights several of the points made earlier: Mastercard clearly had a 
better idea of what was going on with the state and local governments 
in Missouri than Missouri government offi cials knew of Mastercard’s 
intentions and options. There were numerous feasible options for the 
site, so Missouri offi cials could not simply assume that Mastercard was 
bluffi ng about the possibility of leaving the state altogether. While press 
reports do not indicate whether Mastercard used a site location con-
sultant, the company apparently used a tactic consultants recommend. 
Without having access to Mastercard decision makers and documen-
tation, it is impossible to say what the lowest amount of subsidy the 
company was willing to accept, but it likely was considerably less than 
what it received.
Much of what currently passes for “economic development” in U.S. 
localities is the subsidization of retail facilities. While Missouri likely 
overpaid for Mastercard, it was at least retaining jobs (and has since 
added several hundred new jobs at the site) that pay on the order of 
$50,000 per year. Retail jobs, by contrast, contain a high proportion 
of low-pay, zero or low-benefi t, often part-time jobs. Why economic 
development agencies pursue them so aggressively is diffi cult to ex-
plain.3 For example, tax increment fi nancing (TIF) is a subsidy widely 
used around the country for attracting retail operations (auto dealer-
ships in California, Wal-Marts everywhere, mixed-use retail/housing 
developments, etc.). In many cases, TIF is close to a straight cash grant 
in its structure: developers receive their money as soon as they have 
paid for the eligible costs specifi ed in a redevelopment plan, while the 
city obtains the money to pay the developer by issuing revenue bonds 
backed by the incremental tax revenue the project is expected to gen-
erate.4 When state law allows a municipality to capture some of the 
sales tax increment, for example 50 percent in Missouri, a Wal-Mart 
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can be shopped around to cities until it fi nds one willing to give it a 
TIF. Municipal governments have proved generally willing, but often 
have received stiff resistance from citizen organizations that form to 
fi ght the plan. Similarly, independent developers dangle pet projects in 
front of municipal governments until one bites. Numerous examples of 
sales tax-driven TIFs exist in the St. Louis metropolitan area, including 
the suburbs of Richmond Heights (Galleria), Brentwood (Brentwood 
Pointe, Brentwood Promenade), Maplewood (Wal-Mart), and Des Peres 
(West County Center), the last a case of alleged blight in a city with a 
median family income over $90,000 in 1990 (St. Louis Post-Dispatch 
various issues).
O’Fallon, Missouri (estimated population 65,000), is the fastest 
growing city in the state. St. Charles County, in which it is located, 
has a higher adjusted median household income than any other county 
in both Missouri and Illinois (O’Fallon Journal 2005). Located across 
the Missouri River from St. Louis County, O’Fallon and St. Charles 
County in general are experiencing rapid migration from the city of St. 
Louis and its inner-ring suburbs. Yet offi cials in the main municipalities 
(O’Fallon, Wentzville, St. Peters, and St. Charles) have been more than 
willing to subsidize retail development, as if it weren’t going to follow 
the residents. St. Peters has used TIF to build a Costco discount super-
center. St. Charles TIF’d the redevelopment of a shopping center lo-
cated just off the exit from the main thoroughfare in Missouri, Interstate 
Highway 70. In 2003, O’Fallon proposed to bulldoze its downtown and 
give the developers involved $47 million in subsidies to build a new 
one at a total cost of $220 million. This case (in which I was an active 
participant, having moved there in 2002) illustrates many of the com-
mon problems seen in competition for investment. The following ac-
count is based on my experience in the battle against this project as well 
as reports in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and the O’Fallon Journal.
The project began shrouded in secrecy, even from members of the 
Downtown Partnership, a consultative group that had been organized 
by the city. When the city announced the project in March 2003, a ma-
jority of the Downtown Partnership’s members resigned.
To determine if downtown redevelopment qualifi ed for the use of 
tax increment fi nancing, the city hired the consulting fi rm Peckham 
Guyton Albers and Viets (PGAV). Like its competitors in the St. Louis 
market, PGAV has virtually never seen a TIF project it said did not 
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qualify, and PGAV concluded that O’Fallon’s mixed-use “Downtown 
Plan” qualifi ed for TIF. By contrast, in Kansas City the Economic De-
velopment Council has full-time staff to work for the TIF Commission. 
Of the proposed TIFs studied by the Kansas City City Auditor, 43 per-
cent were discouraged by TIF staff, 24 percent were denied by the TIF 
Commission, and 33 percent were approved (Funkhouser 1998, p. 88). 
The small size of municipalities in the St. Louis area reduces the level 
of expertise available to them and increases the number of competitors 
for any development project. Unsurprisingly, the Brookings Institution 
(Luce 2003, p. 16) found that there are far more abuses of the origi-
nal intent of the TIF statute (i.e., to develop economically deprived or 
“blighted” areas) in the St. Louis area than in the Kansas City area. 
Many of the approximately 100 businesses and 50 homeowners did 
not want to move, and the city made it clear that it would use its power 
of eminent domain if necessary. As has been the case in many other 
instances around the country, subsidy abuse goes hand in hand with 
what might be called “eminent domain abuse,” where rather than taking 
property for infrastructure or other government uses, a city will make a 
legislative fi nding that a private development project is a “public use” 
and replace one private business with another. U.S. Supreme Court rul-
ings have long directed lower courts to give great weight to legislative 
fi ndings, and up to now they have been virtually impossible to chal-
lenge in court, for eminent domain (most recently in the 5–4 Kelo v. 
New London case) or for tax increment fi nancing. However, the Michi-
gan Supreme Court ruled 9–0 in 2004 that such takings were unconsti-
tutional, and the U.S. Supreme Court in Kelo v. New London held that 
states could give property owners greater protection against economic 
development projects if they so desired.5
In Missouri, municipalities are required to do a cost-benefi t analysis 
of any TIF project outside Kansas City that is carried out as part of the 
consultant’s determination of the project’s eligibility for TIF. The prob-
lem here, as we see in other examples of competition for investment, is 
that these analyses end at the jurisdictional border. Indeed, they often 
end at the development area’s border, ignoring the effects of subsidized 
competition on sales of other fi rms, making much of the sales tax in-
crement “phantom increment,” as I called it in testimony before the 
O’Fallon Board of Aldermen. 
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In many cases, elected offi cials try to thwart citizen participation. 
In Hazelwood, Missouri (an inner-ring suburb of St. Louis), the city 
refused to accept charter amendment petitions, urged people to remove 
their names from them, and passed the ordinances establishing a TIF 
at their last meeting before Christmas, leaving opponents 20 days to 
acquire signatures referring the ordinances to the ballot at the worst 
possible time of the year to do so (they did not get enough signatures 
in time). In O’Fallon, the city threatened to charge people a fee for put-
ting up a “Preserve Old Town O’Fallon” yard sign (it eventually backed 
down), refused to allow signs in Board of Aldermen meetings, and its 
public relations fi rm set up an Astroturf “citizens’ group” to fi ght the op-
position Old Town Preservation Committee. However, in the O’Fallon 
case, citizen opposition was so widespread that a majority of aldermen 
were swayed against the project, and the mayor withdrew it in August 
2003.
CONCLUSION
This chapter highlights both the structural sources of competition 
for investment and the concrete policy issues that arise when a city or 
state pursues an investment. There are several policy conclusions we 
should take away from this analysis. First, too much economic develop-
ment activity takes place behind closed doors. In many states, there is 
no way to even fi nd out how much state and local governments give in 
subsidies. The fi rst recommendation, then, is to adopt transparency and 
accountability legislation, as pioneered in Minnesota, which requires 
state and local governments to report all subsidies individually and to 
take sanctions against fi rms that fail to keep their commitments. If the 
true extent of subsidization becomes widely known, I believe it will 
become a more salient issue than it has been in many states. Some states 
may need strengthening of their Sunshine Laws (in O’Fallon, aggres-
sive use of Missouri’s Sunshine Law yielded a great deal of valuable in-
formation). In addition, there should be a guarantee of a referendum on 
large projects which completely change the character of a city (some-
thing unavailable in O’Fallon’s case due to its classifi cation as a Fourth 
Class city). Second, Congress should enact a national ban on relocation 
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subsidies. Since these merely move jobs from one place to another with 
no benefi t to the country as a whole, they are the most egregious type of 
subsidy and one that is widely recognized as a problem. At the time of 
this writing, the case Cuno v. Daimler-Chrysler is before the U.S. Su-
preme Court. If the Appellate Court’s decision is upheld, it would inval-
idate certain investment tax credits in Ohio and other states (Johnston 
2006). Similarly, states should ban the use of in-state relocation sub-
sidies, which has been a problem with TIF use in Minnesota’s Twin 
Cities area (LeRoy and Hinkley 2000). In the long run, I would argue 
that we need to move closer to the European Union’s model of estab-
lishing rules about what is and is not an allowable subsidy, along with 
the means to monitor and enforce these rules. That has been the only 
model of successfully controlling location and other subsidies (Thomas 
2000, pp. 238–240).
Notes
The author thanks the participants in the “Reining in the Competition for Capital” con-
ference for their feedback, along with comments from Dennis Judd, Terry Jones, Lana 
Stein, and Andrew Glassberg.
 1.  The term “market for investment” was coined by Guisinger (1985, p. 13). He 
considers fi rms to be the “buyers” of investment sites, and governments to the 
“sellers” of those locations. However, due to the structural imbalances described 
below, it is more natural to see the market as truly one for the investments 
rather than the investment sites, making states the “buyers” and companies the 
“sellers.”
 2.  Interestingly, multiple Lexis/Nexis searches of MasterCard and Dallas, as well 
as contact with the business editor of the Dallas Morning News, turned up no 
references to such negotiations in Texas publications. This suggests that while 
the company said it had other options it was considering, it was in fact was only 
considering the St. Louis area. One site location consultant told me he routinely 
recommends this stratagem to his clients. Numerous instances of this practice 
are documented in LeRoy (2005). Note that I reject his contention in Chapter 2 
that subsidies almost never affect location choices. This is inconsistent with his 
acceptance of a prisoner’s dilemma model of avoiding subsidies. If subsidies 
do not increase the probability of landing an investment or cutting a ribbon, a 
prisoner’s dilemma cannot arise.
 3.  It may have to do with the size of the municipality. Smaller governments are usu-
ally not held accountable by their voters for overall macroeconomic outcomes, 
so their economic development efforts are aimed more at tax revenue than job 
creation (Thomas 2000, p. 44n29). However, by the logic of my model, the over-
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all location pattern of retail facilities is likely to be little changed if all munici-
palities use location subsidies than if all refrained from doing so.
 4.  In Missouri, many TIFs, especially smaller ones, are fi nanced on a pay-as-you-
go basis. In such cases, TIF is not equivalent to a cash grant because the stretch-
ing out of payments over time reduces the present value relative to the nominal 
value. See Missouri Department of Economic Development (2005).
 5. See the following pages from the Institute for Justice Web site: http:/www.ij.org/
private_property/michigan/index.html and http://www.ij.org/private_property/
connecticut/index.html (accessed February 2005). 
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